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Common justifications for the use of the letter of credit fail to ex
plain its widespread use. The classic explanation claims that the letter
of credit provides an effective assurance of payment from a financially
responsible third party. In that story, the seller - a Taiwanese cloth
ing manufacturer, for example - fears that the overseas buyer Wal-Mart - will refuse to pay once the goods have been shipped.
Cross-border transactions magnify the concern, because the difficul
ties of litigating in a distant forum will hinder the manufacturer's ef
forts to force the distant buyer to pay.1 The manufacturer-seller solves
that problem by obtaining a letter of credit from a reputable bank. A
reputable bank is unlikely to default on its obligation to pay the seller,
and the seller knows that it has an absolute right to payment once it
ships the goods - conditioned only on the seller's presentation to the
bank of the specified documents (typically the invoice, a packing list,
an insurance certificate, and a transport document such as a bill of
lading). Thus, the story goes, the seller that obtains a letter of credit
can rest assured that it will be paid even if the buyer would not pay
voluntarily.2
The payment-assurance story is logical and plausible. But it rests
on a line of reasoning that is largely untrue at one important and criti
cal point: the seller's possession of an absolute right· to payment.
When I spoke anecdotally to bankers and lawyers familiar with the in
dustry, they uniformly claimed that sellers ordinarily do not present
documents that conform to the requirements of the letter of credit.
Among other things, documents might be missing, late, or fail to pre
cisely match the details about the shipment provided in the letter of
credit.3
1. Lisa Bernstein's article in this symposium also focuses on the special difficulties of
cross-border sales transactions. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: Value Creation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forth
coming June 2001).
2. I myself have told that story. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYS1EMS AND
OTIIER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 215-24 (1999). For similar accounts in the standard
sources, see JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETIERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND
STANDBY CREDIT 'l[ 1.01[3], at 1-7 (rev. ed. 1999); CLAYTON P. GILLETTE ET AL., PAYMENT
SYSTEMS AND CREDIT INSTRUMENTS 560 (1996); JAMES J. WJilTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 20-1, at 701-02 (4th ed. 1995).
3. For published references to the discrepancy problem, see Vincent M. Maulella, Pay
ment Pitfalls for the Unwary: How to Make Your Letter of Credit Work, WORLD TRADE,
Apr. 1999, at 76 ("US bankers report that 50% to 60% of all letter of credit document pres
entations are found discrepant on first examination."); Martin Shaw, Martin Shaw Claims

There Are Better Ways to Reduce Discrepancies and That ICC Should Take Advantage of
Them, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS INSIGHT, Spring 1999, at 11 (reporting the views of "in
formed observers" that "at least 50% - some say perhaps 60% or even 70%" of presenta
tions do not comply). See also U.C.P. preface, at 4 ("Some surveys indicate that approxi
mately fifty percent of the documents presented under the Documentary Credit are rejected
because of discrepancies or apparent discrepancies.").
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Under the standard payment-assurance account, the whole trans
action hinges on the seller having a reliable right to payment by the
bank that issues the letter of credit. But if the seller often does not
submit documents that conform to the letter of credit, then the seller
has no right to payment at all, just a request for a payment that will be
honored only if the buyer waives the defects in the seller's presenta
tion.4 And if the seller's ability to collect rests on the buyer's uncon
strained choice to waive defects in the seller's presentation, then why
buy the letter of credit instead of the simpler (and presumably
cheaper) course of shipping the goods and simply waiting for payment
from the buyer?5 That parties to a sale transaction would ignore for
mal documentation requirements is not surprising, but their systematic
purchase of a product conditioned on their compliance with require
ments they commonly ignore does not appear rational.
Intrigued by that question, I explored the topic in detail in the
summer of 1999. I gathered data in two ways. First, I visited five
separate banks on-site to collect data on their letter-of-credit transac
tions. Although all of the banks are located in the United States, I
selected institutions of sufficient variety to get a representative picture
of the industry as a whole. I visited the following banks: (a) a large
U.S. regional bank headquartered in the Midwest with significant
letter-of-credit volume; (b) a mid-sized U.S. regional bank headquar
tered in the Northeast with significant letter-of-credit volume; (c) a
major U.S. domestic bank headquartered in the West with worldwide
letter-of-credit operations; (d) a major foreign bank, with more than
one U.S. location and with worldwide letter-of-credit operations; and
(e) a major U.S. bank headquartered in the Northeast with worldwide
letter-of-credit operations.6 At each bank, I personally collected in
formation on 100 transactions (fifty "import" transactions, in which
the bank's client was the buyer, and fifty "export" transactions, in
which the bank's client was the seller).7 For each transaction, I re-

4. See U.C.P. art. 14{c) (authorizing issuer of letter of credit to approach applicant to
seek a waiver of discrepancies in presentation).

5. For a brief description of the principal alternate methods of payment, see
tion III.A.

infra Sec

6. In order to obtain access to the banks' files, I had to agree not to disclose the par
ticular banks that I visited.
7. The transactions were selected to provide a random sample of recently completed
transactions. Because the object of my study is to examine discrepancies in presentations, I
excluded files in which the seller never presented a demand for payment under the letter of
credit. Also, to avoid oversampling particular transactions, I only collected one profile from
each file (even if the file included numerous presentations on a single letter of credit). At
each bank, I continued to select files until I had a total (not counting the excluded files) of 50
import and 50 export transactions.
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corded twenty-five data points.8 Among other things, I determined
whether the presentation conformed to the letter of credit and, if it did
not, what the discrepancies were, and the parties' response to them.9
As a matter of practicality, I relied entirely on the banks' internal
documentation of those issues. The banks, of course, could have erred
in their assessment of discrepancies, but given the point of my study understanding how parties react to discrepancies - data regarding
their perception of discrepancies is directly relevant.10
To supplement the raw data, I also interviewed ten bankers who
engage in letter-of-credit transactions.11 I interviewed five of the bank
officers who supervise the sites that I visited, and five officers at other
banks with substantial letter-of-credit portfolios (two other large
American banks, and three Tokyo-based Japanese banks).12 Those in
terviews explored the significance of discrepancies in letter-of-credit
transactions.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the basic letter-of-credit
transaction. Part II describes the discrepancies that appear in those
transactions, providing detail from the data I collected. The data gen
erally support the anecdotal information that led me to conduct the
study: the documents presented in the 500 transactions I examined
conformed to the letter of credit only 27% of the time. The payment
transactions rendered the discrepancies irrelevant because the buyer
waived the discrepancies in all but one case and provided full payment
for the shipment in spite of the discrepant presentation.13

8. The information - about 12,500 data points - is in a Microsoft Access database.
For further information about the data and its analysis, see infra the Statistical Appendix.
Copies of all of the data and statistical analyses are available upon request.

9. I also collected a variety of background information: whether the letter of credit was
confirmed; the countries in which the buyer and seller were located; the time when payment
was due under the letter of credit, whether the letter of credit permitted multiple draws; the
type of goods covered by the letter of credit; how the applicant paid the issuer for drafts on
the letter of credit; whether·the discrepancies suggested a contractual default; whether the
discrepancies appeared to be curable, how the export-side bank responded to the docu
ments; whether an export-side bank missed discrepancies that an import-side bank found;
how waiver of discrepancies was sought; and how many days elapsed before the applicant
waived the discrepancies.
10. In any event, it would not have been possible to reexaniine the documents; in most
cases the original documents (which often include transport documents that the buyer must
use to obtain the merchandise in question) no longer were in the file.
11. Transcripts of the interviews (redacted to satisfy confidentiality requirements) are
available upon request.
12. The two U.S. interviews were conducted by telephone; the Japanese interviews were
conducted in person in Tokyo. The two interviews with U.S. banks were conducted on con
dition of anonymity. Two of the Japanese banks were Fuji and Sumitomo; the third inter
view was conducted on condition of anonymity.
13. Even in that one case (Profile 457), the seller did not refuse payment entirely, but
authorized a discounted payment of 94% of the amount upon which the parties originally
had agreed.

2498

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2494

Part III uses the data and the interviews described above to assess
the possible reasons for the common use of letter of credit. First, I
reject the possibility that businesses use letters of credit out of irra
tional habit or custom because the ready availability and frequent use
of alternative payment transactions strongly suggests that businesses
rationally use letters of credit. Second, I evaluate the persuasiveness
of the classic payment-assurance story and conclude that the payment
assurance story probably still has some plausibility, at least in contexts
(such as many exports from the United States) where parties select the
letter of credit to compensate for the weakness of relational ties be
tween the buyer and the seller.
Finally, I consider some alternative reasons that might motivate
commercial enterprises to use letters of credit. Specifically, I argue
that the issuing bank's ability to verify information about the pur
chaser and the transaction provides the most compelling reason for
widespread use of letters of credit. The issuer verifies information
about the purchaser and the transaction in two ways. In the first and
principal scenario, commonly used in situations where the parties have
no significant relationship, the willingness of the bank to issue the let
ter of credit signals to the potential seller that the purchaser will not
withhold payment for illegitimate reasons. In the second scenario, the
bank's willingness to issue the letter of credit verifies to the govern
ment (or another financial institution) the legitimacy of the transac
tion, and the letter of credit indirectly assists in the enforcement of
currency controls and laws against money laundering.
Those two explanations share a common and obvious thread - the
problem of information asymmetry. In both situations, the parties de
sign a transaction to include a letter of credit to respond to an infor
mation imbalance at the time the transaction begins. Thus, to use my
own terminology, I argue that the letter of credit generally serves as a
verification institution to resolve that information problem.14
I.

THE BASIC LEITER-OF-CREDIT TRANSACTION

This study focuses on the basic commercial15 letter-of-credit trans
action. That transaction has two sides: an import side (the buyer) and

14. For a general discussion of verification institutions, see Ronald J. Mann, Verification
Institutions in Financing Transactions, '07 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1999).
15. The reference to "commercial" letters of credit limits my study to letters of credit
used to provide payment in the ordinary course of a contract for the sale of goods. I exclude
the other principal type of letter of credit, the "standby" letter of credit often used to pro
vide a secondary means of payment when an obligor defaults on some other obligation. See
DOLAN, supra note 2, 'l[ 1.04, at 1-20 to -24 (discussing the distinction between commercial
and standby letters of credit); MANN, supra note 2, at 372-73 (same). For the sake of com
parison, I did, however, collect information at two banks on discrepancies in standby letter
of-credit transactions. My data on that point, however, are much more limited (only 24 files)
because it is quite rare for presentations to be made against the kind of standby letters of
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an export side (the seller). Both sides ordinarily have a bank, which
makes a total of four parties to the transaction. The bank on the im
port, or buyer's, side of the transaction normally issues the letter of
credit, which obligates the bank to pay the purchase price upon the re
ceipt of specified documents.16 Letter-of-credit rules typically describe
the importer as the applicant, and the applicant's bank as the issuing
bank or the issuer of the letter of credit.17 The fees differ significantly
from market to market, and from customer to customer (with better
customers paying much less). As a general matter, however, the total
fees for the banks issuing and processing the letter of credit are likely
to approximate one-quarter of one percent of the amount of the letter
of credit. On a $1,000,000 sale of goods, then, use of a letter of credit
would require about $2,500.18 Figure One illustrates the typical trans
action.
F!GURE 1

Issuing the Letter of Credit
3. Is:,"'Ues Letter of Credit

2. Applies for
Letter of
Credit

l

Bank

5. Goods

14.

Informs Seller
Letter of Credit
Ra>i Been Issued

Beneficiary/

Applicant/
Purchaser

,
Denefitciary s

-o

.

Issuing Bank

..
'4
1. Conb:act Providing

Seller

for Payment by
Letter of Credit

credit described above. (Presentations are common against so-called "direct-pay" standbys,
1.06, at 1-45 & n.170, but I excluded those transactions from the
sample that I examined.) Those data are included in the same database as the principal data.

see DOLAN, supra note 2, 'lI

16. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(10) (defining a letter of credit as an undertaking to pay in re
sponse to a documentary presentation); see also U.C.C. § 5-lOS(g) (authorizing the issuer to
"disregard" any nondocumentary conditions in a letter of credit}; U.C.P. art. 13(c) (same).
17. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(2) {defining "applicant" for purposes of letter-of-credit law);
U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(9) (defining "issuer" for purposes of letter-of-credit law); U.C.P. art. 2
(defining "Applicant" and "Issuing Bank" for purposes of the U.C.P.).
18.

See MANN, supra note 2, at 217.
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Central to the letter-of-credit system is the concept of independ
ence: the bank's obligation on the letter of credit is completely sepa
rate from any of the contractual obligations of the underlying transac
tion, either the obligation of the buyer to pay the seller under ordinary
principles that govern sales transactions, or any obligation that the
buyer might have under an agreement or common-law principles to
reimburse the bank for payments made on its behalf under the letter
of credit.19 The bank's obligation depends entirely on the beneficiary's
presentation of documents that conform to the requirements of the
letter of credit.20 Indeed, the rules governing letters of credit so thor
oughly separate the bank's obligation to pay from ordinary context
laden principles of contract law, that it is best thought of, to use Roy
Goode's apt term, as an "abstract payment undertaking" - an en
forceable undertaking to make payment wholly abstracted from the
underlying transaction.21
The bank on the export, or seller's, side plays a different role. The
seller hopes to receive the funds offered by the letter of credit as pay
ment for the anticipated shipment, and is thus identified as the "bene
ficiary" of the letter of credit.22 Because the beneficiary and applicant
ordinarily are in different countries,23 the beneficiary often has its own
bank to help process the letter of credit when it is issued by the appli-

19. In the U.C.C.'s language:
Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary...under a letter of credit are independ·
ent of the existence, performance, or nonperformance of a contract or arrangement out of
which the letter of credit arises or which underlies it, including contracts or arrangements be
tween the issuer and the applicant and between the applicant and the beneficiary.
U.C.C.§ 5-103(d); see U.C.P. art. 3(a) (" Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions
from the sales or other contract(s) on which they maybe based and banks are in no way con
cerned with or bound by such contract(s), even if any reference whatsoever to such con
tract(s) is included in the Credit.").
20. See U.C.P. art. 4 ("In Credit operations all parties concerned deal with documents,
and not with goods, services and/or other performances to which the documents may re
late."). Neither the U.C.C. nor the U.C.P. requires any particular documents to be pre
sented; each letter of credit describes the documents to be presented. It is quite difficult to
generalize, but a typical list would include, among other things, an invoice, packing list, in
surance certificate, some transport document (such as a bill of lading), and often some form
of inspection certificate.
21. RoyGoode, Abstract Payment Undertakings, in EssAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 209,
209-13 ( Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1991). For a more readily available explanation
of the point, see Roy Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings and the Rules of the Interna
tional Chamber of Commerce, 39 ST.LOUIS U.LJ. 725, 731-35 (1995).
22. U.C.C.§ 5-102(a)(3) (defining "beneficiary" for purposes of letter-of-credit law);
U.C.P. art.2(i) (defining "Beneficiary" for purposes of the U.C.P.).
23. The goods were shipped from one country to another in all but 51 (10.2%) of the
files. Even that figure may be distorted by an unusuallyhigh rate of same-country files at
the bank to which I refer as the Major Northeast Bank (33 of the 51 same-country ship
ments). Excluding the Major Northeast Bank, the rate of same-country shipments was only
4.5%.
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cant's bank overseas and then forwards the documents that seek pay
ment from the issuer when the seller ships the goods.24 The benefici
ary's bank ordinarily assumes one of two roles.25 If it only "advises"
the beneficiary of the issuance of the letter of credit, it just processes
the documents and has no direct liability on the letter of credit.26 Al
ternatively, it might "confirm" the letter of credit, in which case the
beneficiary's bank directly obligates itself on the letter of credit,27 pays
the beneficiary directly, and then forwards the documents to the issuer
for reimbursement.28 Figure 2 illustrates the payment process.
FIGURE2

Payment by Letter of Credit
�----�

3. Documents Evidencing
Shipment

�----�

Beneficiary's

Issuing Bank

Bank

4. Payment

f

2. Documents

s--��

Evidenci11g
Shipment

Beneficiary/

Applicant/
Purchaser

1. Shipment of

Seller

Goods

24. The beneficiary presented documents directly to the issuer, without retaining its own
intermediary financial institution, in only 15 (3% ) of my files. Again, that rate may be dis
torted by an unusually high rate of direct presentation files at the Major Northeast Bank (9
of the 15 direct presentations). Excluding the Major Northeast Bank, the rate of direct pres
entations was only 1.5%.

25. The beneficiary's bank is described in the statute as a "nominated person," that is, a
person that the issuer permits to process documents from the beneficiary and obtain pay
ment from the issuer. U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(11).
26. See U.C.C. § 5-107(c); U.C.P. art. 7(a).
27. See U.C.C. § 5-107(a); U.C.P. art. 9(b). In the 247 export-side files that I examined,
the beneficiary's bank confirmed the letter of credit in 55 (22%) of the files.
28. The U.C.C. grants that right of reimbursement indirectly. U.C.C. section 5-108(i)(l)
grants the issuer a right of reimbursement against the applicant; U.C.C. section 5-107(a)
states that the confinne r has the same rights against the issuer as the issuer has against the
applicant. See MANN, supra note 2, at 230-31.
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DISCREPANCIES IN LEITER-OF-CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

I set out to collect information about discrepancies in the presenta
tions that beneficiaries make seeking payment on commercial letters
of credit. Accordingly, I start by describing what the data suggest
about those discrepancies. The data, of course, can only suggest ex
planations, because I did not collect information from a statistically
valid sample of all letter-of-credit transactions. Although I collected
my data from banks of varying sizes and types, the broad inter-bank
variations within the data indicate that a complete picture of discrep
ancies would require a larger study based on a statistically valid sam
ple drawn from a broader range of transactions.29
Nevertheless, the consistency of certain patterns provides consid
erable information about the dynamics of commercial letter-of-credit
transactions and how they can function with such high rates of dis
crepancies. I first discuss the discrepancies themselves; then I turn to
the response of the applicant to the discrepancies.
A.

The Nature ofthe Discrepancies

As expected, the data illustrate a high rate of discrepancies: the
presentations conformed to the letters of credit in only 135 (27%) of
the 500 files. Although the rates did differ from bank to bank - with
a high of 36% and a low of 17%30 - conforming presentations pro
vided the exception to a general pattern of discrepancy. The data of
fer considerable detail about the types of defects and the types of
transactions where they frequently occur. Accordingly, I discuss those
topics in turn.

1.

What Are the Discrepancies?

The data reveal the surprising severity of the discrepancies and, to
my mind, rebut any suggestion31 that the high discrepancy rates re
ported by anecdote and found in the files arise from hypertechnical
document examination practices.32 First, more than a quarter of the

29. That point is underscored by the significant explanatory power of the identity of the
bank among the banks from which I collected files. See infra Statistical Appendix.
30. The conformity rates were 26% at the Midwest Bank, 17% at the Mid-Sized North
east Bank, 29% at the West-Coast Bank, 27% at the Foreign Bank, and 36% at the Major
Northeast Bank.
31. See, e.g., Boris Kozolchyk, The UNIDROIT Principles as a Model for the Unification
of the Best Contractual Practices in the Americas, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 151, 160-61 (1998) (ar

guing that "arbitrary" judicial evaluations of discrepancies "had encouraged bad faith prac
tices by bankers and their customers whereby meaningless defects in the documents ten
dered by beneficiaries were used to justify nonpayment of letters of credit").

32. Clay Gillette suggests in his comment on this Article that bankers have an incentive
to classify documents as discrepant to protect themselves against claims by their customers
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presentations that contained discrepancies (98 out of the 343 files,
29%)33 appeared to suggest a contractual default by the seller - not
just a failure to comply with the technical provisions of the letter of
credit, but a failure to comply with the substantive provisions of the
underlying sales contract.34 Moreover, although the relatively subjec
tive problem of defective documents arose frequently,35 a large num
ber of the noncontractual defaults were plainly objective defects in the
presentation upon which no informed document examiner could dis
agree. For example, 75 of the presentations (22%) did not contain a
document required by the letter of credit; 62 (18%) involved a ship
ment later than the period specified in the letter of credit; in 48 (14 %)

of wrongful honor. See Clayton P. Gillette, Letters of Credit as Signals: Comments on
Ronald Mann's 'The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions,' 98 MICH. L. REV.
2537, 2538-39 (2000). One difficulty with that view is that it ignores the likelihood - which I
consider quite strong - that bankers want to avoid an appearance of unduly strict document
examination because undue strictness undermines their apparent willingness to stand behind
the letters of credit that they issue.
Moreover, if he is correct, bankers should support relatively vague standards for docu
ment examination. Cf., e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indetermi
nacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927-40 (1998) (presenting an analogous
argument that the interests of Delaware corporate lawyers are advanced by indeterminacy of
legal rules). In fact, although the examination practice might seem hypertechnical to the
outsider, U.S. banks have expended considerable effort to enhance the objectivity of docu
ment examination. The bankers might be suffering from false consciousness, but they cer
tainly believe that objectivity in examination standards furthers their interests, primarily by
making it easier to identify bad actors (so that reputational sanctions can root them out).
The most recent effort is illustrative, the promulgation of a detailed document (used at all of
the banks that I visited) describing the items that banks should check on the most co=only
presented types of documents. See U.S. COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL BANKING, INC.,
STANDARD BANKING PRACTICE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF LETTER OF CREDIT
DOCUMENTS (1996); see also Boris Kozolchyk, The "Best Practices" Approach to the Uni

formity of International Commercial Law: The UCP 500 and the NAFTA Implementation
Experience, 13 ARIZ.J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 443, 446-48 (1996) (discussing development of the
uscm standards). As doubts about the standards for document examination overseas sug
gest (see, e.g., infra notes 47 & 50), it is not at all clear that those efforts have made signifi
cant progress overseas.
33. Although 365 files failed to comply, 22 of those files were not even examined: in
those cases the applicant approved payment without the need for examination of the docu
ments. Thus, the information that I report about the types of defaults states percentages as a
share of the 343 examined files found to be discrepant.
34. As mentioned in the introduction, I relied entirely on the banks' assessment to de
termine what discrepancies existed. See supra text accompanying note 10. I had to judge for
myself, however, whether the discrepancies suggested a contractual default, something that
was not always clear. I made a judgment call at the time I examined the file as to whether I
thought the discrepancies collectively raised a serious doubt about the performance by the
seller. Because I was interested in the frequency with which technical defects that do not go
to the seller's performance appear as discrepancies, I tried to err on the side of assuming that
there might be a default.
35. Defects in documents collectively constituted the largest category of discrepancy,
appearing in 293 (85.4%) of the files. It is particularly difficult to determine whether defec
tive documents suggest a contractual default, because it is rarely possible to tell from the file
whether the defect reflects inadequate performance or inadequate documentation of ade·
quate performance.
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the beneficiary presented documents late36; in 36 (11 %) the letter of
credit had expired37; and in 16 (5%) the documents sought payment
for an overdraft (an amount that exceeded the balance remaining on
the letter of credit).38
TABLE ONE: TYPES OF DISCREPANCIES

Defective Documents

293(85%)

Missing Documents

75(22%)

Late Shipment

62(18%)

Late Presentation

48(14%)

Expired

36(11%)

Overdraft

16(5%)

Incorrect Shipment

14(4%)

Partial Shipment

7(2%)

Other

2(1%)

Total Discrepancies

554

Total Discrepant Files

365

Files Not Examined

22

Files Examined

343

Those discrepancies, however, do not generally suggest a serious
failure of performance by the seller on the underlying sales contract;
in 201 of the files (59%) , the defects did not suggest a contractual de
fault by the beneficiary.39 Defects in those files, although often objec
tively indisputable problems with the presentation, do not suggest de
fault because they involve minor documentary defects such as an
inadequate signature on a bill of lading or a technical inaccuracy in de
scribing the collateral, to name two common examples; or other de-

36. Unless the letter of credit stipulates otherwise, documents must be presented no
later than 21 days after the date of shipment. See U.C.P. art. 43(a). It was not common for
the parties to alter that 21-day period in the letters of credit that I examined.
37. In addition to the implied deadline for presentation mentioned in the previous note,
each letter of credit includes an express date on which the credit expires. Any later presen
tation is defective. See U.C.P. art. 42(b); see also U.C.P. art. 44(a) (implied extension of ex
piration date to next business day).
38. In assessing those numbers, it is important to remember that many presentations
contained multiple defects. Thus, the figures in the text count most of the files multiple
times (because discrepant files often contained multiple defects, 554 defects in 343 examined
files with discrepancies).
39. As mentioned above, I treated ambiguous cases as suggesting a default. See supra
note 34. Thus, that 59% figure is, if anything, understated.
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fects of presentation rather than performance - late presentation (48
files,14%),40 expiration (36files,11%),or overdraft (16files,5%).
TABLE Two: DISCREPANCIES AND CONTRACTUAL DEFAULT

Discrepancies Indicating Default

98/343(29%)

Discrepancies Not Indicating Default

201/343(59%)

Residual(Unable to Classify)

44/343(13%)

The data highlight one structural difficulty with the letter-of-credit
system. If the system worked perfectly, documentary presentations
would sort transactions based on the beneficiary's performance: the
documents would comply when the beneficiary had performed as
agreed and the documents would not comply when the beneficiary had
not performed as agreed. 41 As the data show,however,more than half
of the files included defects that vitiated the beneficiary's right to col
lect payment, even though those same defects did not call into ques
tion the caliber of the beneficiary's performance on the contract. As
industry observers recognize, the poor fit between discrepancies and
default suggests a problem with the letter-of-credit system.42
2.

When Do Discrepancies Appear?

Even a casual examination of the data suggests that the discrepan
cies do not appear uniformly throughout the transactions. Dividing
the files into import and export transactions provides the most appar
ent distinction.
As discussed above,each transaction has an import side and an ex
port side. Because I collected information about transactions with the
banks on both sides, I can explore the possibility that discrepancy
rates relate to the role played by the bank. The rate of discrepancies
might relate to the bank's role because a bank on the import side
normally reviews documents that the beneficiary's bank has already
evaluated. All other things being equal, that relationship would sug
gest a lower rate of discrepancies on the import side of the transaction
40. Late presentation (which I did not treat as a contractual default) must be distin
guished from late shipment, which I did treat as a contractual default.
41. I leave to one side the question whether the performance that the system seeks is
performance up to standards set by unenforceable industry norms or performance up to the
standards of judicially enforceable contractual provisions. For discussion of the distinction
between those two different types of standards, see Bernstein, supra note 1.

42 See Shaw, supra note 3, at 11-12. Bob Rasmussen has pointed out to me that the
poor fit is less relevant if you accept the idea (proposed in Part III of this Article) that letters
of credit operate prinlarily as a device for verifying the reliability of the applicant rather than
as a device for assuring payment. In any event, analysis of that problem is far beyond the
scope of this Article.
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than on the export side: the beneficiary's bank should weed out defec
tive documents in some class of cases, so that it would not even for
ward the most obviously defective documents to the issuer. Similarly,
the beneficiary's bank could help the seller to correct simple discrep
ancies. As a result of those processes, I expected that an issuer acting on the import side of the transaction - would receive a
"cleansed" pool of documents to review, with a lower rate of discrep
ancies than it would find in documents it reviewed from the export
side of transactions.
As Table Three suggests, however, my data contradict that under
standing. The import-side files in fact contain a significantly higher
rate of discrepancies (78%, 196 out of 253 files)43 than the export-side
files (69%, 169 out of 247 files). Moreover multivariate analysis sug
gests that the distinction between import and export transactions was
not ultimately useful in predicting the existence of discrepancies.44
TABLE THREE: DISCREPANCY RATES BY TRANSACTION TYPE

Import Transactions

NUMBER OF

PERCENTAGE OF

DISCREPANCIES

DISCREPANCIES

196/253

77%

Export Transactions

169/247

68%

Overall

3651500

73%

Instead, that analysis suggests that the location of the applicant
and the issuer had significantly more explanatory power. Specifically,
as Tables Four and Five illustrate, a first glance at the data suggests
that the documents are particularly less likely to conform if the appli
cant or the issuer is located in the industrial West (the United States,
Canada, the European Union, Israel, Switzerland, and the United
States) and more likely to conform if the applicant or the issuer is lo
cated in industrial Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore,

43. Because I do not have access to the files of the export-side bank that handled the
import-side files that I examined, I do not know what the rate of discrepancy was when the
documents originally were presented by the customers in those transactions; I know only the
rate of discrepancy that persisted after processing by the export-side bank, as evidenced by
the documents reviewed by the import-side bank. The rate of discrepancy identified in the
text does not change significantly even if I exclude the fifteen direct presentations (as to
which the "cleansing" hypothesis is not relevant). All of the direct presentations (obviously)
were import transactions (because the beneficiary-seller came straight to the issuer without
using an intermediary export-side bank). Excluding those transactions (five of which in
volved conforming documents), the import discrepancy rate would have been 78% (186 out
of238).

44. A detailed description of the multivariate analysis appears in the Statistical Appen
dix.
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South Korea, and Taiwan), with the rate for nonindustrialized nations
falling between those two.
TABLE FOUR: DISCREPANCY RATES BY APPLICANT REGION
NUMBER OF
TRANSACTIONS

PERCENTAGE W/
DISCREPANCIES

Industrial West

280

79%

Industrial Asia

123

59%

Nonindustrialized

97

72%

TABLE FlVE: DISCREPANCY RATES BY ISSUER REGION
NUMBER OF
TRANSACTIONS

PERCENTAGE W/
DISCREPANCIES

Industrial West

283

79%

Industrial Asia

124

60%

Nonindustrialized

93

73%

For several reasons, it is difficult to provide a persuasive explana
tion for that pattern. The most natural expectation would be that the
level of industrialization of the applicant and issuer would correlate
with the rate of discrepancy: it would be plausible to expect benefici
aries to worry less about discrepancies in documents seeking payment
from applicants and issuers in industrialized nations where reputa
tional sanctions would be most likely to be effective. That explanation
does not fit a pattern in which nonindustrialized nations fall solidly be
tween the industrial West and industrial Asia. Hence, whatever vari
ables might best explain conformance rates, it appears that the distinc
tion between the import and export sides of the transactions is not
useful, and that more data are required before a plausible explanation
can emerge.
That finding is particularly puzzling given the evidence from the
data showing that export banks (at least U.S. export banks, the only
ones for which I have collected data) expend considerable effort to
cure discrepancies. As I mention above, the beneficiary's banks iden
tified discrepancies in 169 of the 247 sets of documents submitted to
them. But the export-side banks obtained complying documents in 68
( 40%) of those 169 files, leaving discrepancies in only 101 files. Thus,
the beneficiary's banks were able to forward documents that complied
in a total of 146 (59%) of their 247 transactions.
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The higher concern about documentary compliance exhibited by
Western banks and exporters provides the most salient explanation for
these figures.45 Comparing the 22% rate46 of incoming conforming
documents (documents that U.S. issuers receive from overseas export
side banks) to the 59% rate of outgoing conforming documents de
scribed in the preceding paragraph (documents that U.S. export-side
banks transmit to overseas issuers) demonstrates that concern most
starkly.47 Contrasting the domestic figures with the rate of complying
documents forwarded by overseas banks further reinforces the higher
regard that U.S. banks and sellers have for producing compliant
documents. Indeed, the 22% figure of incoming compliant docu
ments, which includes both initially compliant documents and initially
defective but cured documents, is less than either (I) the rate of ini
tially defective documents cured by U.S. export-side banks (40%, 68
45. Indeed, more than one banker suggested that in Asia banks offer a standard product
in which the seller agrees up front that its bank will not examine the documents, but instead
will forward them immediately to the issuer without determining whether they comply. See
Notes from Site Visit to Foreign Bank 1 (Aug. 26, 1999-Aug. 27, 1999) [hereinafter Foreign
Bank Site Visit Notes] (copy on file with author); Notes from Site Visit to Midwest Bank 4
(July 28, 1999-July 29, 1999) [hereinafter Midwest Bank Site Visit Notes] (copy on file with
author). It is not likely that the pattern that I discern is permanent. More than one banker
suggested that a reverse pattern - more compliant documents coming into the United
States than going out - was characteristic in earlier years. See Telephone Interview with
Manager, Trade Service Issues, Second Major Northeast Bank 5-6 (Sept. 21, 1999) [hereinaf
ter Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview] (transcript on file with author);
Telephone Interview with Vice President and Operations Manager, West-Coast Bank 4
(Aug. 12, 1999) [hereinafter West-Coast Bank Interview] (transcript on file with author); see
also Interview with Yutaka Abe, Senior Manager, Overseas Business Division, The Fuji
Bank, Limited, Tokyo 3 (June 15, 1999) [hereinafter Fuji Bank Interview] (transcript on file
with author) (suggesting that discrepancies formerly were much higher in Japanese import
transactions than they are now).
46. That rate is simply the flip side of the 78% discrepancy rate in import-side transac
tions. I also should emphasize that the rate differs considerably from bank to bank. In my
data, it varied from 72% to 82%. One other U.S. banker with a large portfolio told me that
the discrepancy rate in his import portfolio was only 60%. Second Major Northeast Bank
Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 2. Furthermore, the identity of the bank was a sig
nificant predictor variable in my multivariate analysis both for the likelihood of conformance
and for the likelihood that defects would be cured. Because I did not collect information
about the customers, I do not have data about variation in discrepancy rates among custom
ers, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the rate varies significantly from customer to cus
tomer. For example, one banker explained that although some of his customers submitted
documents that complied 99.9% of the time, others submit documents that are discrepant
90% of the time. Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 15;
see also Maulella, supra note 3 ("[S]ome exporters report that over 95% of the document
presentations are in order; other exporters report a 95% frustration rate.").
47. Again, because I do not have access to the files of the export-side banks in my
import-side transactions, there always is the possibility that those banks had a systematically
different view of the rate of discrepancy in the documents that I transmitted. See infra note
51 (discussing anecdotal evidence related to document-examination practices in Japan). To
make any sense of the practice, however, I have to use some baseline for compliance, and
given data collected only from U.S. banks, it makes sense to use U.S. document-examination
practices as a baseline. Responding to that concern, I hope to collect similar data in Japan
later this year.
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out of 169) or (II) the rate of initially compliant documents submitted
by exporters in this country (32%, 78 out of 247).
TABLE SIX: IMPORT AND EXPORT COMPLIANCE

NUMBER OF
COMPLYING FILES

PERCENTAGE OF
COMPLYING FILES

Import Compliance Rate

57/253

23%

Total Export Compliance Rate

146/247

59%

Initial Compliance(by Customers)

78/247

32%

Cured (by Bank)

68/169

40%

Although a variety of considerations doubtless contribute on a
country-by-country basis to the differing rates of attention to discrep
ancies, the interviews with bankers suggest that the relative reliability
of the Western commercial and banking systems is the leading general
cause. They explain it as follows: the party sending goods into the
United States tends to worry less about the likelihood of misconduct
by the U.S. purchaser than a corresponding U.S. exporter considering
the likelihood of misconduct by an overseas purchaser.48 Indeed, the
same idea supports the notion that letters of credit on shipments into
the United States serve a different function (unrelated to the reliabil
ity of the U.S. buyer49) from the function that they normally serve on
shipments out of the United States (where the reliability of the over
seas buyer might be central to the use of the letter of credit).50
This explanation does not ring true with all countries in which
trading partners of Western companies are located, but it probably
covers many less-developed countries with relatively unstable eco
nomic conditions and undeveloped legal systems. Together, those
conditions can make the reliability of the letter of credit less crucial
for the party selling goods into the West than for the party selling
goods out of the West. Accordingly, the Western exporter sending

48. See West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 7 {"Our whole setup is based on
not sending documents out of here which a bank overseas can find discrepancies with . . .
because we know that in some areas of the world it's a tendency to find discrepancies for the
sole purpose of coming up with a discount."). Interestingly, one banker suggested that
banks follow country-by-country conditions so closely that they step up the vigilance of their
document checking in countries (such as Asian countries in recent years) that appear to be
undergoing particular crises. See Telephone Interview with Vice President, Bank Number
One 12-13 {Aug. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Midwest Bank Interview] (transcript on file with
author). As he explained, although the banks in the country under stress might honor dis
crepant documents 99% of the time under normal conditions, "in hard times they might re
ject half of them." Id. at 13.
49. See infra Section ill.C.2.
50. See infra Section m.C.1. I thank Bob Rasmussen for pushing me to see that point.
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goods overseas (and its bank) will work harder to ensure that it has
complied with the conditions of the letter of credit than an overseas
exporter sending goods into the West (and its bank).51
Indeed, the interviews suggest that in many countries the export
side bank transmitting goods into the United States will not even
bother to examine the documents before forwarding them.52 Thus, in
those cases the bank makes no effort at all to cure discrepancies, a far
cry from the apparent American banking practice of scrutinizing
documents and curing about 40% of the discrepant documents submit
ted by their customers.53
Because I did not examine export-side transactions in the files of
any overseas banks, I have no direct observations of their effort (or
lack of effort) to cure defective documents. I can, however, examine
the frequency with which defects are cured in the dataset that I col
lected. As the statistical appendix explains, the data indeed suggest
that the location of the applicant in the industrialized West is the most
significant predictor of a cure of defective documents, but they suggest

51. Some loose evidence of the less stringent document-review practices overseas seems
to be apparent from the perception of Japanese banks that there is a very low rate of dis
crepancy in the documents they receive from their clients in export transactions. See Inter
view with Deputy General Manager {Special Assignments), Deputy General Manager, and
Senior Manager, Anonymous Japanese Bank, Tokyo (June 17, 1999) [hereinafter Anony
mous Japanese Bank Interview] (transcript on file with author) (reporting a discrepancy rate
on export transactions of only 35%); Interview with Hiroshi Higuma, Assistant Manager,
Corporate Planning Dep't, The Sumitomo Bank, Ltd., Tokyo 3 (June 21, 1999) [hereinafter
Sumitomo Interview] (transcript on file with author) (reporting a discrepancy rate on export
transactions of only 15% {albeit after cure efforts at the branch-bank level)).
Those rates suggest to me that a considerably different standard for document examina
tion prevails in Japan than the one that prevails in U.S. banks reviewing documents received
from Japan. As it happens, my information on documents coming into this country from
Japan (4 of the 13 Japan-based import transactions {31 %) included complying presenta
tions) is too limited to support any inferences about those practices. Moreover, even if I ex
amined Japanese transactions at a Japanese bank, it would not provide direct evidence of
the relative rigor of their document examination practices. The most obvious test would re
quire using U.S.-trained examiners to study a set of documents also submitted to Japanese
examiners; that type of test is not practical with the logistical resources available for my re
search.
52 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (mentioning references to that practice),
53. Clay Gillette suggests in his comment on this Article that the high rate of uncured
defects is unsurprising, reasoning that buyers easily could cure the defects in the rare case in
which a seller is intransigent. See Gillette, supra note 32, at 2539. In most cases, however,
that would be impractical. For one thing, no amount of effort could cure a presentation that
involves a late shipment, late presentation, or expired letter of credit. At least one of those
defects appeared in 98 of the 343 discrepant files that I examined. Furthermore, because
documents ordinarily must be presented no more than 21 days after the shipment, see U.C.P.
art. 43{a), supra note 36, and because documents ordinarily are presented quite close to the
presentation deadline in the first instance, it seems most unlikely that a buyer in any signifi
cant group of cases could (a) present discrepant documents; {b) await rejection by the seller;
(c) cure the discrepancy; and {d) still represent compliant documents before expiration of
the 21-day time frame.
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that the location of the applicant in the West correlates with efforts to
cure, a finding that is, again, precisely opposed to my hypothesis.s4
For several reasons, however, that finding should not be given un
due weight. First, as with all of the multivariate findings discussed in
the appendix, the variables as to which I collected information explain
only a small portion of the variance, only 5% of the variation in cure
rates.ss Also, because all of the transactions in question involve U.S.
beneficiary's banks, the distinction between U.S. issuers and foreign
issuers is complicated by the "same-country" nature of the transac
tions that involve Western applicants and issuers - almost half of the
cases that involve Western applicants or issuers are transactions com
pletely internal to the United States. Third, and perhaps most seri
ously, the findings related to curability of defects are much more am
biguous. As with the analysis of rates of conformance, those findings
do not show a consistent distinction between industrialized and nonin
dustrialized nations.56
Given the difficulties with making sense of what the data suggest
related to any of the geographic variables, it is useful to look briefly at
other possible explanations. For example, one banker suggested that
price changes that make opportunism more beneficial occur more
commonly with commodities shipments (which characterize transac
tions going out from the United States) than on manufactured-goods
shipments (which characterize transactions coming into the United
States).57 A thorough analysis of that question would require consid
erably more specific data than I collected, but the data do suggest that
the type of goods is relevant in some way, because the type of good
was the most powerful explanatory variable of the willingness of an
applicant to submit documents with curable defects: curably defective
documents were particularly associated with garment transactions and

54. See infra Statistical Appendix. As with all of the statistical results, the predictive
force of that variable is relatively small.
55. See infra Statistical Appendix. That finding also is somewhat confounded by the
contrary results for the issuer region variable (which suggest that a Western issuer is least
likely to be associated with a cure). That seems to me most likely to be caused by the cir
cumstance that most of the Western issuer/Western applicant transactions are same-country
U.S. transactions, as to which the analysis in the text related to export transactions is inappli
cable. Thus, I discount significantly the issuer region data, pending efforts to collect data
from banks located in a country outside the industrialized West (Japan).
56. Specifically, those findings show that a willingness to submit curable documents
{sloppiness) is associated (incoherently, to my mind) with Asian issuers and nonindustrial
ized applicants and inversely correlated with Western issuers and Asian applicants. See infra
Statistical Appendix. That finding is particularly problematic because that equation is the
most successful in explaining variation, producing an adjusted explained variance of 8%.

57. See Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 6.
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particularly unlikely in transactions involving durable manufactured
goods.58
The variety of explanations offered by the bankers further under
scores the need for considerably more data to explain the phenomena
persuasively. For example, another banker pointed to the differing
types of typical credits for the two sets of transactions: incoming
shipments into the United States are much more likely to be a part of
substantial long-term relationships (as to which discrepancies are less
important)59 while outgoing shipments from the United States are
much more likely to be "one-off'' transactions where the shipper en
joys limited relational protections.60 That explanation cannot easily be
assessed without data collected from the files of the applicants and
beneficiaries about their relations with their customers, data not in
cluded in the existing dataset.
In the end, however, it should not be surprising that the objective
variables that I collected are so ineffective as predictors of discrep
ancy. Nobody suggests that beneficiaries, or their banks, intentionally
submit documents with discrepancies. Rather, discrepancies are most
likely to arise from a general inattention to detail. And, unless benefi
ciaries in their banks can develop cognizably distinct levels of inatten
tion to detail based on features of a particular transactions, it should
not be surprising that the existence of a mistake in any particular case
should be almost random. The point can be overstated, because the
data do strongly suggest that there are some country-by-country ef
fects. But it seems clear that those effects cannot be understood from
a dataset collected from a single country. Thus, although the dataset
seems adequate to suggest a high level of discrepancy (the principal
point of this article), it seems clear that data from another country will
be necessary to learn more about the pattern within which discrepan
cies appear.

58. See infra Statistical Appendix; see also infra notes 112-113 (discussing unique charac
teristics of garment transactions).
59. As suggested above, see supra text accompanying notes 49-50, that thesis gains some
support from the analysis in Section IIl.C.2, which outlines several country-specific reasons
why export transactions from the United States might use letters of credit in continuing rela
tionships, even though there is good reason to think that exporters generally use letters of
credit less often in continuing relationships, see infra p. 2518 (discussing the possible inverse
connection between letters of credit and the strength of the buyer-seller relationship).
60. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 11-12; see also Interview with Vice
President and Manager, International Operations, Bank Number Two 12 (Aug. 5, 1999)
[hereinafter Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview) (location not disclosed to protect ano
nymity) (transcript on file with author) (explaining that relational considerations are the
prime motivation for buyers to waive discrepancies in documents presented for payment on
letters of credit).
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Waiving Discrepancies

Because the frequency of discrepancies motivated this study, the
information described above was not entirely surprising; it confirmed
anecdotal descriptions with an added wealth of detail that serves as
fodder for new speculation. The response to the defaults was the most
surprising. I expected to find that applicants seize on the discrepan
cies in a significant number of cases - including many cases in which
the discrepancies did not suggest a contractual default - as a basis for
delaying or withholding payment to the beneficiary on the letter of
credit.61
The data suggest that my expectation was wrong: even when the
documents suggest a default on the underlying contract, applicants
almost always waive the discrepancies and permit full payment to the
beneficiaries under the letter of credit. In the 365 files with discrepan
cies, the applicants waived the discrepancies and permitted full pay
ment in every file but one. And in that file the applicant did not ref
use payment; it permitted payment of 94% of the agreed amount.62
Thus, in the 500 letter-of-credit transactions examined, the applicant
never refused payment on the letter of credit.63 The data do not vary
from assertions by bankers involved in the industry; every interview
subject with whom I spoke about payment refusal claimed that appli-

61. My expectation was supported by the views of the drafters of the U.C.P., who report
that "[s]ome surveys indicate that approximately fifty percent of the documents presented
under the Documentary Credit are rejected because of discrepancies or apparent discrepan
cies." U.C.P. preface, at 4. In hindsight, I can make that statement correct by interpreting
the reference to "reject[ion]" to mean only a determination of discrepancy, but before I did
this study, I interpreted it to mean rejection in the sense of refusal to accept.
62. Profile 457. That transaction included some defects that did not demonstrably indi
cate contractual defaults: expiration, late presentation, a missing document (one counter
part of a purchase order), and a defective document (technically inaccurate shipping terms).
It also included, however, a late shipment, which normally would reflect a default on the un
derlying contract.
63. In all of my files, the banks immediately paid upon receipt of the waiver. It is, how
ever, the view of the industry that the bank is not bound by the waiver issued by its customer
the applicant. See International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), MORE QUERIES AND
REsPONSES ON UCP 500, 1997: Opinions of the ICC Banking Commission, at 14 (Gary
Collyer ed., 1997) (Response 254) ("In the event that discrepancies are observed in a presen
tation of documents and the issuing bank [gives adequate notice of the discrepancies], the
issuing bank is under no obligation to take up the documents, even if a proper waiver of the
discrepancies is received from the applicant."); id. at 28 (Response 267) ("The receipt of a
waiver from the applicant, either direct or via the beneficiary, does not bind the issuing bank
to accept the documents. The decision of whether or not to comply with the waiver is one
for the issuing bank to decide in its sole judgment."). It appears that the only substantial
reason that a bank would decline to accept such a waiver would be doubts about its ability to
obtain reimbursement from the applicant. See Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone
Interview, supra note 45, at 6-7.
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cants would refuse payments in less than one percent of the discrepant
files.64
Even more surprising than the rate of waiver was how quickly ap
plicants waived defaults. Several bankers suggested that applicants even if they ultimately permit payment - commonly delay payment
for a significant period of time to reflect dissatisfaction with the bene
ficiary's performance in the transaction. B ut the data suggest that ap
plicants generally waived promptly. Of the 196 import files with dis
crepancies, the applicant in more than half of the files - 103 (53 % ) waived the discrepancies within one business day after the issuer con
tacted the applicant about the discrepancy. By one week after the is
suer contacted the applicant, they waived discrepancies in 165 (84% )
of the files.65 By four weeks after the issuer contacted the applicant,
only six files (3 % ) remained unaccepted.
As a practice of accommodation in transactions among long-time
partners, the rate and pace of waivers might seem commonplace. B ut
as we see below, many letters of credit are used in one-shot transac
tions or other contexts where relational constraints have less force,

64. See Foreign Bank Site Visit Notes, supra note 45, at 1 (estimating three refusals each
year out of 10,000 presentations, for a rate of .03%); Telephone Interview with Executive
from Bank Number Five 10 (Oct. 8, 1999) [hereinafter Major Northeast Bank Interview]
(transcript on file with author) ("I would have said it was a small fraction of one percent.");
Telephone Interview with Vice President, Technical Consultant for Global Trade Services,
Major Midwest Bank 7 (July 19, 1999) (interview conducted on condition of anonymity)
[hereinafter Major Midwest Bank Telephone Interview] (transcript on file with author) ("I
would say ninety-nine percent of the documents [that are discrepant are paid]."); Second
Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 5 ("[A]t the end of the day
ninety-nine point nine percent of the documents they present, whether they carry discrepan
cies or not, are paid."); Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 45,
at 17 (banker who does 100,000 transactions a year suggesting that "I would be very com
fortable in just guessing [that the number of rejected documents per year is] less than a hun
dred. It may be less than ten."); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 7 (agreeing
with my expectation of finding only one or two refused presentations in my 500-file study).

The pattern appears to be similar in Japan. See Anonymous Japanese Bank Interview,
supra note 51, at 7 (suggesting rejection of about ten documents out of a monthly volume of
17,000 transactions); Fuji Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 9 (reporting rejection of docu
ments or reduction of amount to be paid in about ten out of every 18,000 transactions);
Sumitomo Bank Interview, supra note 51, at 4 (suggesting rejection of ten documents out of
a monthly volume of one thousand noncomplying transactions).
65. One week (five business days) serves as a rough guide of a timely response, because
the issuer generally needs to respond to the bank that presented the documents within seven
business days after it receives the documents. See U.C.P. art. 13(b) (calling for a response
within "a reasonable time, not to exceed seven banking days"). If the issuer takes two busi
ness days to examine the documents, that would leave five business days for the applicant to
decide whether it wishes to waive any discrepancies without preventing the issuer from
transmitting a timely acceptance of the documents. Of course, if the issuer does not receive
a waiver by the seventh business day, it still can pay later, by sending a notice rejecting the
documents on the seventh business day, followed by a later notice accepting the documents
with discrepancies. For a thorough discussion of typical practice, see International Fin. Serv.
Ass'n, Statement of Practice: Reasonable Time for Examination & Notice of Dishonor, in
THE 1999 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LETTER OF CREDIT LAW & PRACTICE 311 (James E. Byrne
ed., Institute of Int'! Banking Law & Practice 1999).
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precisely because of the lack of confidence in the relationship.66
those contexts, that rate of waiver seems truly startling.

In

III. WHY LETTERS OF CREDIT?
The data presented in Part I display an odd and puzzling picture.
Commercial parties pay substantial fees to banks to use letters of
credit in their transactions.67 The beneficiaries then usually submit
documents that do not conform - which jeopardizes their right to
payment under the letter - but the applicants then almost universally
waive the defects with startling haste, notwithstanding the frequent
contractual defaults displayed on the face of the documents presented
by the seller.
The remainder of this Article offers some tentative explanations
for that pattern. Given the worldwide use of the commercial letter of
credit, and its use in a wide variety of contexts, no single explanation
captures all of the motivations for its use. The information collected
in this study does, however, allow me to make some progress in under
standing the transactions. Thus, this Part of the Article begins in Sec
tion A by rejecting the idea that businesses use letters of credit be
cause of some sub-optimal path dependence or mistake. Section B
then critically assesses the payment-assurance story, concluding that it
cannot provide a general explanation, but likely continues to play
some role, especially in relation-deprived uses of letters of credit. Fi
nally, Section C offers two new justifications for the use of letters of
credit, both of which turn on the ability of the issuer to verify to a
third party some present or future fact about the buyer or the transac
tion. None of the explanations qualifies as a general, unified explana
tion for all of the transactions in which businesses use commercial let
ters of credit. Taken together, however, they provide a general
picture of plausible motivations for much of the universe of commer
cial letter-of-credit transactions.

A. The Road Not Taken: Irrational Habit and Path Dependence
Perhaps no rational explanation elucidates the puzzle presented by
the high discrepancy rates: businesses use letters of credit not because
of the benefits they provide, but because of a combination of practical
factors such as a failure to understand how letters of credit work in
practice, along with some habit of usage. To put it more directly, that

66. See infra p. 2518 (discussing reasons why parties select letters of credit instead of
other payment mechanisms).
67. See MANN, supra note 2, at 217. Because all methods of payment in cross-border
transactions involve some out-of-pocket transaction costs, the excess cost of the letter of
credit is a bit less than that $2,500 figure.
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perspective suggests that businesses buy letters of credit from banks
by mistake - because they always have - and that if they fully un
derstood the costs and benefits of letters of credit they would use al
ternate payment systems.
The mistake story cannot be rejected out of hand: businesses can
not have perfect comprehension of everything that they do and surely
they occasionally enter into transactions on terms attributable to im
perfections in their understanding.68 But two factors make me doubt
the general applicability of the mistake theory.
First, the sophistication of the parties involved reduces the credi
bility of the mistake theory. Many of the users of letters of credit are
large and sophisticated companies. In the study, for example, I re
viewed the files of' several prominent discount retailers and depart
ment stores that obtained letters of credit to pay their overseas suppli
ers. And they did not use letters of credit occasionally or haphazardly;
on the contrary, the files clearly documented that those companies
have large letter-of-credit relationships covering a substantial portion
of their sales activity.69 Absent some new evidence, it seems implausi
ble that those companies would organize such a large number of
transactions in a way that systematically, repeatedly, and pointlessly
increases the cost of the transactions.
The larger framework of the institutions for providing payment in
cross-border sales transactions also casts doubt on the mistake expla
nation, because it shows that businesses make a conscious and deliber
ate choice to select the letter of credit from among a variety of com
peting payment institutions. Generally, sellers and buyers can choose
from four significantly different methods of providing payment in
cross-border transactions. Ranging from most favorable to the seller
to most favorable to the buyer, the options include prepayment, pay
ment by letter of credit, payment by documentary collection, and open
account.70
The first and the last options are the simplest and cheapest, but
they create the greatest possibility for opportunistic misconduct by the
trading partner. In the prepayment transaction, the buyer forwards
68. For comments to that effect in this context, see Fuji Bank Interview, supra note 45,
at 13-14 (discussing the lack of sophistication by smaller companies doing international trade
and explaining that "there's a perception for the Japanese company that the LC is very
credible, reliable. And once they receive an LC they feel like they have completed the
transaction."); Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 15, 17
(suggesting that customers focus on the fact that their letter-of-credit transactions get paid
rather than the risk of nonpayment).
69. The size of such a relationship was particularly evident at two of the banks (Banks
One and Four), whose file-numbering systems included a separate filing system - with
separate numbers and file locations - for the transactions of two prominent retailers that
are their largest letter-of-credit customers. Each of those customers provided, on a conser
vative estimate, more than 20% of the bank's letter-of-credit work.
70. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 6-7.
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payment before the seller ships the goods. In the open-account trans
action, the seller ships the goods without any formal assurance that the
buyer will forward payment when the goods arrive. Thus, in each of
those transactions one party first performs completely, trusting the
other party to respond by performing in turn.71
In between those two polar choices lie two intermediate choices,
the letter-of-credit and documentary-collection transactions. Those
transactions intertwine the performance of the parties, with each party
taking substantial steps toward performance before either party com
pletes its activities. In the letter-of-credit transaction, as discussed
above, the seller waits to ship until it receives a letter of credit issued
on behalf of the buyer. The buyer, in turn, withholds payment until it
receives adequate evidence that the shipment has occurred, as shown
by the documents required for payment under the letter of credit.
The documentary-collection transaction (or, commonly, a collec
tion transaction) is another intermediate option, cheaper but less pro
tective of the seller than the letter-of-credit transaction.72 The seller
ships the goods without any previous action by the buyer to effect
payment, but a transport document transmitted through banking
channels covers the goods. In the typical (though not universal) way
of arranging the transaction, the buyer cannot obtain the document of
title, and, thus, cannot obtain the goods that the document covers, un
til it pays the bank for the goods.73 The collection transaction favors
the seller less than the letter-of-credit transaction because the buyer
has no obligation to take up the documents.74 Hence, the buyer might
not be able to get the goods without paying for them, but the seller
cannot force the buyer to pay; if the buyer chooses not to pay, that the

71. See :Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 6.
72. For a more detailed summary, see MANN, supra note 2, at 457-66. For descriptions
by a banker, see :Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 6-7. Because two of
the banks that I visited maintained records on documentary-draft transactions at the same
sites as they maintained letter-of-credit records, I collected information on documentary
draft transactions at those sites (50 records at each bank for a total of 100). Those records
are in the same database as the other data.
73. See :Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 7 ("If the documents are
titled properly then no pay, no documents for merchandise."). Two common variations use
nonnegotiable documents of title. In one, the goods are consigned to the collecting bank;
that has substantially the same effect as a negotiable shipment, because the buyer usually
must pay to acquire the goods. See id. at 8-9. The other common variation, particularly in
shipments by air, uses nonnegotiable documents and ships directly to the buyer. In that
transaction the buyer can obtain the goods without paying the bank for them. See id. at 8.
Thus, that transaction provides the seller little more protection than the open-account trans
action discussed above. The transactions proceeded in that less protective fashion in 33 out
of the 96 (34 % ) collection transactions for which I could examine the relevant documents.
74. See :Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 8 ("[A] collection raises the obliga
tion of absolutely nobody to do anything that they don't want to do."); West-Coast Bank
Interview, supra note 45, at 13 ("[Y]ou're completely putting yourself at the mercy of that
party [i.e., the overseas buyer].").
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seller must deal with goods that it has shipped to an overseas location,
with no local buyer for them.75 The collection transaction provides a
more secure option than an open-account transaction (where the
buyer can get the goods without paying for them), but not by much.
Collection transactions, however, cost much less than a letter-of-credit
transaction, with bank fees typically fixed in the range of $100-$300,
regardless of the size of the transaction.76
The available information makes it clear that parties can realisti
cally and freely choose among those four payment systems. Signifi
cantly, the choice suggests that the letter of credit is not the automatic
response of a custom-bound industry. Businesses do not use letters of
credit indiscriminately out of habit. Rather, they select them for
transactions in which they do not have a good enough relationship
with the overseas party to justify engaging in collection or open
account transactions. As one banker put it, "there has to be trust be
tween the two before you send the documents on collection.'m In
deed, the best information I found indicates that businesses use letters
of credit in only about one-fifth of cross-border sale-of-goods transac
tions coming into or out of the United States.78
75. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 7. Buyers declined to
pay the banks in 12 out of the 100 collection transactions. That 12% nonpayment rate is
striking compared to the nonpayment rate in the letter-of-credit transactions of less than
one-tenth of one percent. The higher nonpayment rate would not surprise the bankers to
whom I spoke about collection transactions. See, e.g., id. at 12 (discussing difficulties of ob
taining payment in collection transactions); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 45, at
13-17 (same).
76. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 15-16 (discussing the dif
ferent types of charges in letter-of-credit transactions and collection transactions); West
Coast Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 12 ("[O]bviously the cost of a letter of credit is very
much higher than a collection. Our collection fees are low - very low in comparison.
[Collections a]re not a big money maker and they're looked at more as a service to a cus
tomer instead of an actual money-making product."); see also supra note 67 (discussing fees
for letters of credit). My estimate of the fees for collection transactions is based on my re
view of the files in my database.
77. Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 8; see Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Inter
view, supra note 60, at 19-20 (discussing reasons why parties choose collection transactions
instead of letters of credit); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 12 ("[T]he only
reason [collection transactions] exist is because there's a great deal of . . . trust between the
parties concerned or in some cases people just would rather take the risk than pay the initial
letter-of-credit fees, which can get pretty expensive."). For a similar view from a knowl
edgeable academic, see John F. Dolan, Letters of Credit: A Comparison of UCP 500 and the
New U.S. Article 5, 1999 J. Bus. L. 521, 528 ("Thus the commercial letter of credit arises
most often between parties that know little of each other or are in distant markets and, when
at least one party is located in a developing economy.").
78. One banker reported to me two sources of data in bis possession. The data that he
considered more reliable suggested that 13% of such transactions were done by letters of
credit, 72% by open account, 4% by documentary collections, and 2% by cash in advance.
Another source (that he considered less accurate) reported 29% letters of credit, 52% open
account, 12% cash in advance, and 7% documentary collections. See Interview with Group
Vice President and Head of Trade Services Product Management, International Trade &
Advisory Group, Bank Number Four 13 (Sept. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Foreign Bank Inter
view] (location not disclosed to protect anonymity of bank) (transcript on file with author).
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The relatively low rate of use certainly does not suggest a market
populated by businesses that buy letters of credit for no good reason.
On the contrary, it suggests a market in which businesses use cheaper
methods of payment whenever the protections of the letter of credit
fail to justify the cost, and in which they select the letter of credit only
when they want its security. Generally, it suggests, businesses use let
ters of credit in one-shot transactions where relational protections are
inapplicable, or in the opening stages of a potential long-term relation
ship, before relational constraints become effective.
B.

The Classic Story: Assurance ofPayment

The payment-assurance story provides the classic understanding of
letters of credit. In that story, the key benefit offered by the letter of
credit is a right of payment enforceable against the issuer. That right
largely removes the risk of the open-account transaction - that the
seller will ship its goods first and that the buyer, once in possession,
will withhold payment from the seller. Put another way, the letter of
credit exchanges the typically uncertain obligation of a buyer to pay
for something received for an absolute obligation of a financial institu
tion.
Part II demonstrates that the payment-assurance method fails to
explain the general use of letters of credit. The payment-assurance
story makes sense only if the seller generally expects to use the letter
of credit to force the issuer to pay. But as the data suggest, an experi
enced seller would understand that it usually cannot force payment
from the issuer, because it usually will not submit documents that
comply with the letter of credit. Thus, in many if not most cases, the
seller's right to payment will depend entirely - at least as a legal mat
ter - on the grace of the buyer in waiving the discrepancies in the
documents submitted by the seller.
To be sure, a weaker version of the payment-assurance story may
supply a better fit with a high rate of discrepancies. For example, if
letters of credit cost little, if sophisticated sellers expect buyers to re
nege and try to withhold payment quite rarely, and if it is expensive to
submit documents that comply, then rational sellers might use letters
of credit generally but accept a high rate of discrepancy, just to keep
the letter of credit in reserve for the rare cases in which buyers try not
to pay.
Indeed, the information I collected about cure efforts suggests that
I incorrectly assumed that high discrepancy rates are inconsistent with
some payment-assurance rationale. Most obviously, the existence of
substantial cure efforts, illustrated by my discussion above of U.S.

Whichever figures are closer to reality, however, both figures suggest that letters of credit
are not used routinely without regard to cost.
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export-side banks,79 indicates that exporters and the banks that serve
them see significant value in producing documents that comply. On
the other hand, the size of the letter of credit is not a useful predictor
of any of the dependent variables that I studied: the rate of discrep
ancy, the rate of submission of documents with curable defects, or ef
forts to cure. If compliance of the documents was significant, then
parties should be trying harder to produce compliant documents in
larger transactions.80
The pattern of cure efforts underscores that correlation. On the
one hand, the largest cure efforts appear in the context - exports
from the United States to overseas buyers - in which parties gener
ally use letters of credit to compensate for the absence of strong rela
tions between the buyer and the seller. Conversely, cure efforts seem
much weaker on imports into the United States. Again, generalizing
with caution, concerns about the reliability of the U.S. importer might
be less substantial.81 Finally and most interestingly, the single context
in which I saw parties dispensing entirely with cure efforts - pur
chasing letters of credit sold at a lower price and processed without
any export-side review of the documents at all - involves transactions
importing goods into the United States.82
To be sure, I cannot credit the payment-assurance effect as any
thing but a relatively weak factor. The large frequency of easily cur
able defects in the files that I examined suggests that it cannot be all
that important to provide complying documents. Defects that the
bank can cause the seller to cure generally could have been avoided
more cheaply in the first place. To use a common example from the
files that I examined, surely a seller would save money writing a draft
correctly the first time rather than writing a defective draft, paying the
bank's discrepancy fee,83 and then taking the time and effort a week
later (after prodding by the bank) to produce a compliant draft. Even
experienced and careful sellers would make mistakes from time to
time, which banks would catch, but a universe in which banks can cure
defects in more than one-fourth (28% , 68 out of 247 export files) of

79. See supra pp. 2508-10.
80. The size of the transaction was significant in the univariate analysis, but the correla
tion was not monotonic (that is, the rate of conformance and efforts to cure did not increase
with the size of the transaction). Moreover, although we included the size of the transaction
in our multivariate analysis, it was not a useful predictor for any of the three dependent vari
ables. See infra Statistical Appendix.
81. I offer in Section III.C.2 a reason for letter of credit usage independent from those
relation-based concerns.
82. See supra note 45 (discussing that product as available to businesses shipping goods
from Asia to the United States); infra note 131 (same).
83. At the banks that I visited, discrepant presentations universally were assessed a fee,
which ranged from a low of $25 to a high of $75.
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the presentations made to them is not a universe populated by diligent
sellers trying hard to avoid obvious mistakes.
In sum, I believe, again based on the limited data, that assurance of
payment must remain part of the story of letters of credit, but that it
provides an incomplete reason for their use. To tell the whole story,
we must look also for some other benefit to the seller that obtains a
letter of credit.
C.

The Letter of Credit as a Verification Institution

If the letter of credit adds real value to the underlying transactions,
and if a right of payment enforceable against the issuer cannot explain
the value, then the value must come from something else provided by
the bank that issues the letter of credit on behalf of the buyer. As a
matter of transactional design, the bank provides some sort of "verifi
cation" of information that it can assess better than any of the other
parties to the transaction.84 The points of difficulty lie in identifying
precisely what the bank verifies and why the parties need the bank to
verify it. Given the limited scope of the data collected to date (which
includes no information about the nature of the customers or their re
lations with the banks or their transaction partners), I can only specu
late at this point. Still, I can identify two separate justifications for use
of the commercial letter of credit as a verification institution: verify
ing to the seller the likelihood that the buyer will pay, and verifying to
the government the legitimacy of the transaction.

1.

Verifying the Likelihood that the Buyer Will Pay

In my view, the implicit verification of the applicant's reliability
and probity that the issuer makes when it issues the letter of credit
generally explains the common usage of letters of credit. Structurally,
that verification furnishes a classic example of reputational interme
diation: the applicant/buyer "rents" the issuer's reputation to allow
the beneficiary/seller to verify the credibility of the applicant/buyer's
promise to make payment when the seller ships the goods.85
Central to that arrangement, of course, is the availability of a repu
tational sanction against the bank that issues the letter of credit. On
that score, I take it as given that banks generally have a strong reputa-

84. I organize my observations here using the framework I previously have developed to
discuss third-party "verification institutions." See Mann, supra note 14, at 2265-71.
85. The classic explanation of reputational intermediation appears in Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 10 VA. L. REV. 549, 618-21

(1984) (discussing reputational intermediation in the issuance of securities); see also Mann,
supra note 14, at 2269-71 (generalizing that idea).

2522

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2494

tional interest in their letter-of-credit businesses.86 For that explana
tion to make sense, however, I need to examine three separate charac
teristics of the transactions in which the letter of credit is used: the
relative ease of verifying the reliability of a foreign bank as opposed to
a foreign trading partner; the plausibility of treating a bank that issues
a letter of credit as vouching for the future performance of its client
the applicant; and the information that the bank is in a position to
provide. I address those problems in turn.

a. Why Evaluate the Bank Instead of the Buyer? The bank helps to
solve the information problem that faces a seller of goods to a foreign
buyer when the seller attempts to estimate the likelihood that the
buyer opportunistically will attempt to withhold payment in the trans
action after the seller ships the goods. Efforts to assess the reputation
of the buyer directly often will be expensive and ineffective.87 For one
thing, the buyer's location in a foreign country makes it more costly to
collect information than if the buyer were located in the same country
as the seller.88 As one banker put it, letters of credit are not as useful
in same-country transactions because "it's easier to get a credit report
cheaper than to force somebody to give them a letter of credit."89
Also, even if the information is available, it may be less reliable to the
seller than information collected in the seller's own country.90 Simi
larly, differences in accounting systems from country to country gen
erate difficulties in the assessment of any objective financial informa
tion that the seller might obtain. Moreover, the sheer number of
potential trading partners worldwide makes the task of maintaining
any knowledge of financial strength and probity daunting at best.

86. The best anecdote I heard about the significance of bank reputation in the letter-of
credit context involved Chinese banks that were barred by the Chinese government from
using hard currency to honor previously issued letters of credit. Notwithstanding the plenary
control of the government over bank activities in mainland China, the officers at those banks
still used a variety of arrangements - offsets against overseas funds and the like - to do the
best they could to provide timely payment on the letters of credit that they had issued. See
Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 3-4.
87. For a theoretical discussion of reasons why it is difficult for many countries to de
velop effective systems for disseminating credible information about their businesses, see
Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets: The
Nontriviality of Securities Law (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with
author).
88. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 4 ("If you're selling to somebody out
side the United States it's very difficult to get good credit information so you try to go to
[Dun & Bradstreet] or whatever you can. But, you get very sketchy information."); Major
Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64, at 7.
89. Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 5.
90. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 5 (pointing out that Dun & Bradstreet
collects information on foreign companies, but suggesting that "companies in another coun
try are not so concerned [as U.S. companies] about [the validity of the information that they
provide Dun & Bradstreet]").
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Although those problems create similar difficulties in the assess
ment of the financial strength and credibility of foreign banks, foreign
parties can much more easily evaluate foreign letter-of-credit banks
than they can evaluate foreign trading partners.91 For one thing, the
universe of reputable letter-of-credit banks is much smaller than the
universe of trading partners: in most countries only a few banks par
ticipate in the global letter-of-credit arena. Thus, parties can obtain
much more information about those banks.92 Second, large banks in
the relevant markets more often follow internationally comprehensi
ble accounting conventions than the great mass of trading businesses
in the foreign country; thus, analysts in the seller's country can more
easily assess information about the buyer's bank than information
about the buyer itself.93 Third, especially for smaller countries with
less stable financial conditions, regulatory authorities more often pro
vide close supervision of the affairs of banks than they do of the affairs
of the large number of trading businesses in the country.94
Taken together, those conditions all work together to make it con
siderably easier for analysts in the seller's country to form a confident
opinion of the reliability of the buyer's bank than of the buyer itself.
That opinion can be in the formal nature of a published rating,95 or it
can be less formal periodic updates that a local bank provides its

91. See Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 14
("When we're asked to confirm a credit - we're making that decision for the most part
based on the bank. . . . We understand the bank and we know the bank and we have a rela
tionship with the bank and we may not have a relationship or know the importer.").
92 See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 5 ("[T]here's an awful lot publicized.
There's a lot you can read in The Economist or other periodicals, magazines, things about
the creditworthiness of various banks and the countries that they're in.").
93.

See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 5-6:

Banks are much more standardized in the way that they do their accounting. . . . lT]hey're
also going to be doing a lot of international activities so there's going to be a lot of pressure
on them from correspondent banks they are doing business with to state their numbers ac
cording to generally accepted accounting principles.
94.

See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 5:

[I]t's also quite true that countries are very sensitive - or at least traditionally very sensitive
- to keeping all of their banks running. So, as long as the country itself is in good condition
it's very unlikely that a bank will go bankrupt . . . [Y]ou can't depend on that completely but
it's a much better risk than a corporate risk.
That observation does not apply, of course, to the United States and other countries suffi
ciently confident in their financial systems to allow bank failures to provide market disci
pline. For discussion of some of the difficulties that regulators face in permitting bank fail
ures, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan's Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks:
Implications for Financial Regulatory Design?, 11 WASH. U. L.Q. 399 (1999); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Is Deposit Insurance Inevitable? Lessons from Argentina, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
211 (1996).
95. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 6 (discussing such a publication);
Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 6 (discussing ratings agencies that rate foreign
banks).
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larger customers,96 or even episodic comments about banks involved in
particular transactions.97 Regardless of the opinion's form, parties in
volved in letter-of-credit transactions maintain constant vigilance over
the activities of the foreign banks with whom they deal,98 and that
vigilance seems much more effective than any comparable monitoring
of the actual trading partners.99

b. Does the Bank Vouch for the Buyer? Although a seller consid
ering a transaction in a foreign country can verify the reliability of the
foreign bank more readily than it can the reliability of the foreign
merchant, what significant information about the foreign merchant
does the foreign bank convey when it issues the letter of credit? After
all, the foreign bank does not accept any financial responsibility for
the actions of its customer, the buyer (except in the indirect sense that
the bank is obligated to pay when the documents in fact comply).
Specifically, and perhaps more to the point, the bank does not under
take even to encourage the buyer to waive any discrepancies that
might undermine the bank's obligation to pay the seller for the ship
ment.
By the time I finished collecting the information for the study, I
became persuaded that banks effectively vouch for their customers

96. See Foreign Bank

Interview, supra note

78, at 6

(discussing the availability of such

updates).

97. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 6 (discussing the bank's willingness to
provide that information); Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 18 {de
scribing requests for such information). The importance of reliable information is under
scored by the common practice of a U.S. bank seeking confirmation from another U.S. bank
of a letter of credit issued by an overseas bank with which the first U.S. bank is not ade
quately familiar. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 18-19; Midwest
Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 6; see also Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64,
at 4 (discussing the value to a Hong Kong bank of having a letter of credit issued by its
North American correspondent).
98. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 16-17 (discussing unwill
ingness to continue processing letters of credit issued by banks whose customers fail to waive
discrepancies in a timely manner); Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, su
pra note 45, at 13 (discussing calls from other bankers about the interview subject's willing
ness to confirm letters of credit issued by lesser-known foreign banks); West-Coast Bank
Interview, supra note 45, at 9-10 (explaining that confirmation by a U.S. bank of a letter of
credit issued by a foreign bank with which he is not familiar would assuage concerns about
the reliability of the foreign bank and its customer).
99. For that reason, I am puzzled by Oay Gillette's argument in his comment on this
Article that a system, that can impose reputational sanctions on banks, should be able to im
pose reputational sanctions on buyers as well. See Gillette, supra note 32, at 2545-46. As I
understand the dynamic, there are relatively few banks in the industry in each country and
the banks serve as intermediaries on both sides of the transaction - collecting information
about the buyers for whom they issue letters of credit and about the banks whose letters of
credit they process. I see no reason why the export-side bank should be lax in that process
simply because it is an adviser rather than a confirmer - the exporting customer expects to
get paid either way, and will be unhappy if the overseas bank and its customer reject docu
ments after the goods have been shipped.
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when they issue letters of credit for them.100 For one thing, some
bankers directly stated that the bank's reputation was at risk whenever
their customers refuse to waive discrepancies in presentations seeking
payment on letters of credit.101 One explained:

[B]anks are very sensitive to their credibility. It doesn't mean they won't
rej ect documents when documents are presented that do not conform to

the letter of credit. They'll do that but they're very sensitive about hav
ing the letters of credit not paid when they are supposed to be paid.102

Indeed, several bankers - especially those to whom I spoke in
Japan - reported that they "persuade[d]" or "pressure[d]" their cus
tomers to waive the discrepancies in any case in which the seller's per
formance was not seriously defective.103
Several bankers, however, insisted that they would not engage in
such efforts, pointing out that their customers are entitled to insist that
the bank adhere strictly to the terms of the letter of credit.104 But a
deeper examination of the practices of those bankers suggests that
even they are vouching for their customers, albeit in a subtle and indi-

100. See Foreign Bank lnterView, supra note 78, at 5 (suggesting that issuance of a letter
of credit provides a "credit reference" and agreeing that the reference extends not only to
financial strength but also to general probity); Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 6
("If you have an issuing bank that is of a certain reputation and class and standing it's not a
difficult leap of faith to say that the customers that they're issuing letters of credits on behalf
of - that . . . the customer is worthy of that extension of credit."); West-Coast Bank Inter
view, supra note 45, at 10 ("[T]hat a bank in India will issue a credit for this importer . . . says
they must think highly of them.").
101. Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 7:
We're very uncomfortable whenever we do refuse a set of documents. So even though I
guess we're pretty willing to find discrepancies and call a customer up and say, "These are all
the discrepancies," . . . [w)e want them to waive all those discrepancies. If they are going to
refuse . . . we want it to be based on good grounds for refusal.

102. Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 17.
103. See Anonymous Japanese Bank Interview, supra note 51, at 5 ("[W]e do not force
them, but we ask them very persuasively to pay immediately."); Fuji Bank Interview, supra
note 45, at 10 ("To suspend the payment sometimes sends a negative message for the
bank."); Fuji Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 11 (discussing efforts to persuade customers
to waive defects); Sumitomo Interview, supra note 51, at 8 ("[I]f there is some slight discrep
ancy then of course we try to persuade them to pay for the draft."). I do not mean to suggest
a peculiar Japanese attitude, only that the Japanese attitude differs from the U.S. attitude.
My only possible source of direct information on the attitudes of bankers from countries
other than the United States and Japan would be my work at foreign-owned banks in the
United States. My impression - which might be worth little - is that the foreign-owned
banks that I visited were not substantially influenced in the "culture" of their letter-of-credit
departments by their foreign ownership. It is true, however, that the only U.S. banker will
ing to admit to a similar practice was at a U.S. office of a foreign bank. He explained:
"We'd tell them that they're playing games and we've actually told customers to take their
business elsewhere if they're going to do that. . • . So, we try to put as much pressure on them
as possible and say, 'You've got to pay.' " Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 9.
104. See Major Midwest Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 64, at 8 ("We don't urge
our clients to pay. That's the client's decision."); Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, su
pra note 60, at 14; West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 3.
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rect manner.105 The dispositive point for me is the consistent state
ments of sophisticated letter-of-credit bankers that they will not issue
letters of credit indiscriminately. All of the bankers with whom I dis
cussed the topic agreed, in one way or another, that they engage in a
serious screening process of customers for whom they issue letters of
credit.106 Although the customer's ability to reimburse the bank for
any payments that it makes on letters that it issues on the customer's
behalf is necessary, it plainly is not sufficient. the process (like much of
commercial banking) involves broader questions of general commer
cial probity and "character."107 One banker put it aptly: "There's
more than just the money. You know, what's their performance his
tory? What's their business history? What are their markets? . . .
[T]here's a whole assessment done of the business aspects. . . . It's not
whether you have ten bucks to put up for the credit."108
The behavior of banks backed up these statements; a bank that be
came convinced that a customer was acting opportunistically with re
spect to its trading partners would consider ceasing to issue letters of
credit for that customer. More than one banker reported incidents in
which the banker refused to continue dealing with major, profitable
customers because of dissatisfaction with the business dealings of the
customer.109 Most importantly, several bankers acknowledged that
one notable type of malfeasance that would undermine the willingness
to continue a relationship would be a pattern of refusing to waive dis-

105. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 4 (describing the significance of
"[t]he fact that a bank is willing to issue a letter of credit for somebody"); West-Coast Bank
Interview, supra note 45, at 9 ("[T]he fact that a bank will issue a letter of credit tells me
something about the credit standing of that customer which gives me a good feeling."). One
banker agreed that many bankers make such a "quantum leap of faith," but that it is "un
warranted." Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 13-14.
He explained that point by identifying several reasons why one bank might be willing to is
sue a letter of credit for a weak applicant, which would not justify a second bank in relying
on the applicant. See id.
106. See, e.g., Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 7 ("[S]imply because somebody
comes in and asks you to issue a letter of credit you're not going to do it.").
107. See Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64, at 4-5 ("U.S. banks in general
will not deal with clients who are disreputable, who are dishonest, whose management is not
known to them, who are in and out of bankruptcy, who are acting in an unethical and dis
honest manner."); see also ERIC N. COMPTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING 284 (1991) (dis
cussing "the five Cs of credit," the first of which is "character of the borrower").
108. Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 7.
109. See West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 11 ("In particular - I know that
our people are very stringent on who they grant credit to because I've seen a lot of their cus
tomers leave or be asked to leave."); Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 10:
[W]e don't like doing business with people like that. We sometimes get ourselves into big
arguments with the relationship managers because they want to do the business
(T]hey
say "Oh, it's a great credit relationship." And we say, "Well, tell them to take their letters of
credit somewhere else then because we just don't want to be associated with people like
this."
. • . •
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crepancies in letter-of-credit transactions110 that went beyond normal
behavior for the particular industry in question111 (with the garment
industry being notorious for a custom of footdragging) .112 One banker
described a typical confrontation on that point as follows:
We'd tell them that they're playing games and we've actually told cus
tomers to take their business elsewhere if they're going to do that. . . . So,
we try to put as much pressure on them as possible and say, "You've got

110. See Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 7 (ex
plaining that the letter-of-credit department would bring to the attention of a client's rela
tionship manager any pattern of delays in waiving discrepancies on letters of credit). For a
similar sentiment from Japan, see Anonymous Japanese Bank Interview, supra note 51, at 11
(suggesting that his bank does not experience substantial problems with failure to waive dis
crepancies because of the quality of companies with which his bank deals).
111. As more than one banker emphasized, some industries (most notably the garment
industry, see infra note 112) are characterized by lengthy delays in waiver of discrepancies on
letters of credit But that does not mean that bankers are reluctant to issue letters of credit
in that industry; rather, it means that they are more tolerant of delays than they would be in
other industries. Even there, however, issuers would cease to do business with an otherwise
profitable customer if it began imposing pre-waiver delays that were longer than customary.
See Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64, at 5-6 ("If I saw a transaction that broke
an industry pattern it would raise eyebrows, it would raise a red flag for me and I hope
whatever bank that was involved that was handling it."); Second Major Northeast Bank
Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 18-19 ("If we had an importer who was doing this
[i.e., refusing to waive discrepancies in a timely manner] on a regular basis and it was outside
the norm then I guess that would be it.").
112. It seems to be common in the garment industry for importers to delay their accep
tance of discrepant documents by lengthy periods of time on the order of a month. See Ma
jor Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64, at 1-3; Second Major Northeast Bank Tele
phone Interview, supra note 45, at 18 ("We have customers here who have money who I
think will jerk beneficiaries around given the opportunity because it's the nature of the trade
they're in. It's the nature of the rag business."); Notes from Site Visit to Bank Number Two
1 (August 4, 1999 - Aug. 5, 1999) (copy on file with author); West-Coast Bank Interview,
supra note 45, at 3. Indeed, many bankers believe that garment-industry letters of credit are
designed by the U.S. importers to be especially complex for the purpose of enhancing the
likelihood of discrepancies. See West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 8 ("Garment
type credits are . . . notorious for discrepancies because of the text of the credits going out.
They're so detailed with regard to merchandise description. It just gives an opportunity for
greater mistakes to be made"). To be sure, the limited willingness to accept discrepant
documents is attributed in part to the greater likelihood that even slight delays in shipment
or slight nonconformities of the product will have an effect on the underlying commercial
transaction. For example, a fall line of clothes that arrives two months late in December is
more likely to have a diminished value than a part needed to repair a broken machine that
arrives after a similar delay. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 1-2.
The delays that those importers impose on discrepant documents usually are followed by
waiver of the discrepancies and full payment on the letter of credit, but there also seems to
be an expectation of negotiation outside the letter-of-credit process that might result in
other concessions not apparent from the bank's files. See West-Coast Bank Interview, supra
note 45, at 3. Moreover, the delays that are typical for the industry appear to be taken into
account in the pricing of the transactions in the first instance. See Major Northeast Bank
Interview, supra note 64, at 6:
It is not up to me to determine what kind of a deal the buyer and the seller strike and when I
started in this business 28 years ago, I was horrified to learn of some of these things until I
discovered that, well yes, but in the rag trade coming from this part of the world that the
vendors figure it's a forty-three day delay when they are dealing with Company A. They
know that and they build it into their prices.

2528

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2494

to pay." And if they say "No, no, no I'm not gonna pay and I don't care
what you say," we say, "We don't want to do business with somebody
like you."113

Similarly, another banker talked at length about his unwillingness
to issue letters of credit with "built-in" discrepancies - letters of
credit that the seller could not possibly satisfy:
I tell you seriously, when we have clients, we have on occasion had dis
cussions with clients who say "I want you to issue a letter of credit with
built-in discrepancies because I want to make sure that the beneficiary
cannot present documents and get paid immediately" and we decline to
do that. And if they insist and threaten to close the account we will close
the account for them because if they are going to act in that kind of a
manner toward their trading partner overseas then what is there to make
me think they will not act in the same unethical manner in their relation
ship with me their banker. I have been involved at this end with other
banks where we literally have gone to a customer who's complaining be
cause we're not putting built-in discrepancies in their letters of credit and
have carried a check with me and closed their account on the spot.114

c. What Does the Bank's Verification Say About the Buyer? The
last difficulty lies in identifying precisely what the bank implies {for it
certainly states nothing expressly) about its letter-of-credit customers.
It seems implausible that the bank offers something as imprecise as a
general credit reference along the lines of "this is the kind of customer
that always pays." If so, then we would expect to see an even smaller
rate of nonpayment in the transactions in which buyers have gradu
ated to documentary-collection transactions from letter-of-credit
transactions.115 But my limited data suggest precisely the opposite: a
nonpayment rate of about 10% in documentary-collection transac
tions116 compared to a nonpayment rate in letter-of-credit transactions
about one hundred times smaller, on the order of one-tenth of one
percent.
Thus, the bank must assert something tied more directly to the
letter-of-credit transaction, probably a general prediction that the
buyer will perform according to industry norms in the letter-of-credit
transaction.117 That prediction - and the parties' need to get the pre
diction from the bank - rests on two distinct features of the issuing
bank's relations with the buyer. The first is the essentially predictive
113. Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 9.
114. Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64, at 4.
115. See supra pp. 2516-19 (discussing the choice businesses make between letter-of
credit transactions and documentary-collection transactions).
116. See supra note 75 (reporting data on that point).
117. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (discussing evidence suggesting
that banks would stop dealing with customers that refuse to follow industry norms in waiving
discrepancies in presentations on letters of credit).
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point discussed above: the bank's ability based on its past interactions
with the buyer to assess the buyer's general probity. The second is a
leverage-related point: the bank's understanding that it can influence
the buyer's behavior on the particular question at issue, the buyer's
willingness to waive discrepancies.
However unconstrained the
buyer's legal right to reject the documents may be, the buyer will often
disappoint the bank if the buyer rejects documents that include dis
crepancies that normally would be waived in the industry in ques
tion.118 And if the buyer knows that the bank will be "disappointed"
by the buyer's conduct, the buyer may refrain from the conduct absent
dire countervailing pressures.119 From the perspective of the seller, the
ability of the bank to influence the conduct of the overseas buyer
might comprise the most important aspect of the letter of credit.
* * * * *

In sum, in addition to the classic explanation - that the issuer will
pay in those cases in which the seller presents compliant documents
I posit a second explanation: that the issuer is confident based on past
experience or its expectation of future leverage that the buyer "volun
tarily" will choose to pay whether or not the documents comply. That
explanation, however, does not carry equal weight as a general expla
nation for the use of letters of credit in transactions exporting goods
into the United States. In inbound transactions, sellers have access to
a considerable amount of apparently reliable information about the
buyers in question, particularly the large retailers that were prominent
in the data.120
Certainly, many overseas exporters have similar concerns about
the reliability of their U.S. customers, but the explanation presented in
this section does not ring nearly as true when the transaction is a pur
chase by Wal-Mart in the United States from a small Taiwanese
clothing manufacturer for whom it is a major customer, as it does with
-

118. The ready willingness to impose nonlegal sanctions on a trading partner for insist
ing upon something that is entirely lawful reminds me of the sanctions that Lisa Bernstein
discusses for "laying down on a contract" in her discussion of the cotton industry. See
Bernstein, supra note 1. I have no firm answer for the deeper question: Why does the bank
sanction the buyer that refuses payment in a transaction supported by a letter of credit but
not in a transaction supported only by documentary-collection arrangements? The most
likely answer seems to be a general understanding of the issuer that its reputation is on the
line for presentations against its letters of credit to be honored, where its reputation is com
pletely disengaged from the results of a documentary-collection transaction. See supra note
74 (reporting the relatively lackadaisical attitude of banks to nonpayment in documentary
collection transactions).
119. See Mann, supra note 14, at 2261-62 (suggesting that the same analysis is a common
justification for guaranties and standby letters of credit).
120. Clay Gillette makes that point well in his comment on this Article. See Gillette,
supra note 32, at 2544.
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a one-time shipment of parts from a U.S. manufacturer to a small
business in India. Accordingly, I turn now to assert a plausible expla
nation for those transactions.

2.

Verifying the Authenticity ofthe Transaction

The second explanation that appeared regularly in my interviews
rests on a variety of usages of letters of credit that serve indirectly to
verify the authenticity of cross-border sales transactions. Because
those justifications make sense only in the contexts in which the re
quirements appear, they are quite local. The most important justifica
tion, for example (the governmental requirements in section (a) of the
following discussion), appears only in transactions that involve imports
into less economically stable countries. Hence, in the sample analyzed
here (limited to transactions involving the United States) it applies
only to export transactions going from the United States to such a
country.
As with the practice discussed in the preceding section, the letter
of credit here serves as a verification institution. Specifically, the gov
ernment or a trading partner uses a direct or indirect letter-of-credit
requirement as a device for limiting the risk of loss from fraudulent or
illegal transactions121 by taking advantage of the superior informa
tional position of the beneficiary's bank.

a. Governmental Requirements. The most common example is a
set of governmental requirements that tends to appear in countries for
which either the weakness of the local currency or concerns about
money laundering justify substantial currency controls.122 The simplest
pattern involves bogus sale-of-goods transactions, a common device
that wrongdoers use to transfer currency out of a country in violation
of applicable governmental rules. The typical scheme uses a transac
tion in which a party in the currency-restricted country purports to
purchase goods from a party in a strong-currency country (such as the
United States or the European Union). If the price of the goods is in
flated - an Indian company buys a dozen tennis balls for $1,000 then performance of the transaction allows the Indian buyer to trans
mit a large amount of currency into a foreign forum, where the Indian
government often has difficulty tracing the funds.123
121. One banker, commenting on a draft of this Article, emphasized the narrow range
of the phenomenon - transactions that are themselves illegal. Banks do not undertake, for
example, to investigate or verify a manufacturer's compliance with child- or prison-labor
regulations.
122 See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 1.
123. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 3-4 {offering that example); see also
Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 2 {offering a similar example); Major Northeast
Bank Interview, supra note 64, at 8-9 (suggesting that the parties don't even bother to ship
goods in those transactions). One banker suggested that a similar transaction could be used
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Governments can use letters of credit to hinder those transactions
by requiring the use of a letter of credit in substantial cross-border
sale-of-goods transactions.124 With such a requirement, the govern
ment obtains an indirect verification of the legitimacy of the transac
tion, because the local bank often would not take the risk of partici
pating in a transaction that seemed likely to involve an illicit transfer
of funds. Thus, by imposing letter-of-credit requirements, the gov
ernment indirectly motivates the banks that participate in the transac
tion to police apparently illicit transactions.125
As it happens, few countries impose such absolute requirements.126
Still, governments do use a variety of less direct devices for protecting
against such transactions, many of which lead indirectly to the use of
letters of credit. For example, the government could require a letter
of credit as a condition of issuing a license in advance of an actual im
port or export transaction.127 Because overseas sellers might want the
buyer to have an advance license to ensure the availability of hard cur
rency to pay for the goods when they arrive, letters of credit are com
8
mon in such a regime.12
Even less intrusively, the government might insist that all transac
tions involving the payment of more than a set amount of hard cur
rency overseas must go through a bank.129 The government then can
require banks that participate in such transactions to verify a number
of particular features of the transaction to prevent fraud. At that

in reverse on large sales of goods going into a currency-restricted country. The Asian seller
could issue an invoice reciting an inappropriately low price; the out-country buyer could pay
the invoice directly and transfer the remainder of the actual (non-invoiced) price in hard
currency to an account for the benefit of the seller in a secure location. See Foreign Bank
Interview, supra note 78, at 2-3 (discussing that transaction as well-known in sales of goods
to mainland China).
124. See :Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 1.
125. It seems clear that bank involvement - however it might be brought about - is
effective in discovering fraudulent transactions. Although it is difficult to get data, one
banker did tell me that his office detects three to five such transactions each week. See Ma
jor Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64, at 7, 9.
126. See :Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 1-2 (discussing such requirements in
Japan after World War II and their gradual disappearance over the intervening years; citing
Malawi and unspecified countries in Latin America as still requiring letters of credit for
transactions in certain commodities).
127. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 1 (offering that scenario). Alterna
tively, the government might accept lower deposits for license applications when the transac
tion has a letter of credit. See :Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 3-4.
128. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 1-2 (offering that explanation); :Mid
Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 60, at 4-5 (same); see also Foreign Bank Inter
view, supra note 78, at 3-4 (describing recent series of transactions in which the Chinese gov
ernment refused to allow Chinese banks to use hard currency to honor letters of credit that
they previously had issued, even in transactions for which the banks had obtained the ap
provals appropriate at the time of the transaction).
129. See :Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 3-4 (suggesting that India imposes
such a requirement for any transaction over the equivalent of $5,000).
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point, the marginal cost of the letter of credit (over a collection trans
action) might become so small as to make it preferable in situations in
which the collection transaction otherwise would be preferable.130
In yet another variation, least intrusive of all, the country does not
insist on letters of credit even to issue the license. But insistence on a
letter of credit offers the best option for the overseas trading partner
to assure the availability of currency to pay for the transaction, be
cause the local bank will not issue the letter of credit without ensuring
that the applicant has obtained the appropriate licenses to allow trans
fer or the required currency.131 That use of the letter of credit protects
the seller against the risk, that after it ships, even a conscientious pur
chaser (and its bank) will be unable to obtain hard currency to pay the
seller for the transaction. In that regime, the government gets the
benefit of the letter-of-credit verification without formally insisting
that the parties use the letter of credit.

b. Private Requirements. Lenders also use letters of credit in a
closely analogous way to verify the authenticity of transactions
brought to them by potential borrowers. The typical pattern here is in
a so-called "packing" credit transaction, in which a business in a major
trading city (Hong Kong, in the most common example) imports
goods from one foreign country that it plans immediately to export to
a purchaser in a third country. If that business (the "packer") wants to
borrow money to fund its acquisition of the goods, or get a letter of
credit to facilitate its acquisition of the goods, the packer must con
vince its local (that is, local in Hong Kong) bank of the legitimacy of
its export transaction.132
A number of bankers explained to me that the letter of credit from
the bank for the U.S. importer allows the Hong Kong bank to verify
that the entire transaction is authentic.133 Essentially, the use of the
letter of credit in those transactions rests on the view of the foreign
bank that it is harder to fabricate a credible letter of credit from a U.S.
bank than it is to fabricate a credible purchase order from a large U.S.
retailer.134
130. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 3-4.
131. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78, at 1-2 (offering that scenario). One
banker explained that in those transactions the parties waive document examination at both
ends of the transaction and that he never has seen rejection of a presentation against such a
credit. See Midwest Bank Site Visit Notes, supra note 45, at 3.
132 See Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64, at 3-4; Midwest Bank Inter
view, supra note 48, at 9-10; Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note
45, at 3; see also Fuji Bank Interview, supra note 45, at 12 (describing that transaction as a
"switch" transaction).
133. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 9-10; Second Major Northeast Bank
Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 3-4.
134. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 48, at 10-11; Second Major Northeast
Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 3-4. As one banker explained, in countries that

August 2000]

Letters of Credit

2533

Like the transactions discussed above, those transactions reflect
use by the trading-center bank of the informational advantage of the
importer's bank. That bank's greater facility at understanding its cus
tomers' transactions justifies its business of issuing letters of credit in
those transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION

The relatively small body of information that I collected cannot
provide a definitive view of the letter-of-credit transaction. Indeed,
the inconclusive analysis of Part II illustrates the need for further data
from other countries and from parties other than banks to obtain even
a simple understanding of the factors that correlate with the existence
of discrepancies in commercial letter-of-credit transactions. Never
theless, it provides a fascinating window to the world of letters of
credit. It should not surprise readers of my past work that I cannot
convince myself of any single unified explanation of the use of letters
of credit.135 Thus, my main goal here is not to explain everything
about why businesses use letters of credit. My goal is less ambitious:
to provide information that will initiate the development of a deeper
understanding of the sophisticated dynamics of the commercial letter
of-credit transaction. I hope that the data I have collected and made
available here will encourage others to look more closely at the prob
lem.

offer interest subsidies for export transactions, the use of a letter of credit can enhance the
amount of the subsidy by extending the term of the loan. See Second Major Northeast Bank
Telephone Interview, supra note 45, at 4-5. Because the bank in a packing-credit transaction
loans the money to the borrower/trading company at the time that the ultimate importer
provides its letter of credit, the interest subsidy can begin accruing at that time. See id. In a
transaction without a letter of credit, the bank normally would not loan the money until the
trading company actually had shipped the goods to the ultimate importer. See id. Effec
tively, that use of the letter of credit transforms a very-short-term transit-financing transac
tion into a much more useful working-capital financing transaction. See id.
135. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 625, 682 (1997) (arguing that no single cause can explain the pattern of secured credit
and suggesting a group of positive and negative factors that collectively can explain that pat
tern).

2534

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2494

STATISTICAL APPENDIX
The data were collected during personal visits to the letter-of
credit processing centers of the five banks. I collected in a Microsoft
Access database information from the 50 most recently closed export
files and 50 most recently closed import files at each bank. The final
dataset includes 253 import files and 247 export files because of misla
beling of files at the banks. For each file I collected and analyzed 52
variables including basic information about the transaction, the loca
tion of the parties to the transaction, the nature of any discrepancies,
and how the banks responded to the discrepancies.
The data were analyzed with the more-than-generous assistance of
Terry Adams from the University of Michigan's Institute for Social
Research. We used the software package MicrOSIRIS from VanEck
Computer Consulting. The three dependent variables were whether
the presentation conformed to the terms of the letter of credit,
whether the defects (if any) were curable, and whether the defects (if
any) was cured. We first used simple one-way analysis of variance to
determine which of the independent variables were significantly re
lated to the dependent variables. We then conducted multivariate
analyses of those variables using Multiple Classification Analysis
(MCA), a maximum-likelihood regression program designed for use
with either binary or continuous dependent variables and with cate
gorical independent/predictor variables.136
In some instances, where it seemed plausible that the processes af
fecting the dependent variables might be different in some subsets of
cases than others, or in ways that might be contradictory over the en
tire population, we ran separate analyses for those subsets of cases.
For example, because several of the explanatory variables were inap
plicable for import cases (such as the distinction between confirmer
and adviser), we ran separate sets of analyses limited to export cases.

Conformance
As explained in the body of the article, 27% of the cases involved
conforming presentations. The final MCA concluded that the most
valuable explanatory variables were applicant region, issuer region,
and bank ID. Specifically, the analysis suggested that, all other things
being equal, conformance is most likely when the applicant from the
least industrial countries or when the issuer is from one of the indus
trial countries, and that there is considerable variation among banks

136. The explanation of multiple classification analysis that follows draws on FRANK M.
of Michigan Inst. for Social
Research 3d ed. 1976).

ANDREWS ET AL., MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS (Univ.
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even after adjusting for the mix of applicants and issuers that they
handle. Collectively, however, those variables explained only 4% of
the adjusted variation in conformance rates. That is, compared to the
number of errors that one would make if one randomly guessed which
cases conformed and which did not, knowing only the 27% overall
conformance rate, knowledge of the three best predictors would re
duce the number of errors made by random guessing by only 4%.
That is a strong indication either that conformance is governed by fac
tors other than those recorded in this data collection, and that it occurs
largely at random in relation to the factors that I did record. That
conclusion is emphasized by the importance of the identity of the
bank; the significance of that variable underscores the possibility that
my results might differ in substantial ways if I collected data from
more or different banks.

Curability ofDefects
The second dependent variable was curability. The defects were
curable in about 62% of the 341 cases in which there was a defect.
The final MCA concluded that the most valuable explanatory vari
ables were type of goods, issuer region, and applicant region. Specifi
cally, the data indicate that curable defects will be tolerated most fre
quently (that is, that beneficiaries care least about presenting
complying documents) when manufactured goods are involved, when
the issuer is from industrial Asia, and when the applicant is from a
non-industrial region.
As with conformance, however, those three factors did not explain
much of the variance in curability rates; collectively, they explained
only 8% of the variance in curability rates. Although that is much
higher than the explained variance for conformance rates, it still pro
vides quite a low level of explanatory power. Thus, as with the con
formance rates, it appears that curability rates generally are controlled
by other factors that I did not collect and are for the most part ran
domly related to the factors that I did collect.

Cured Defects
The final dependent variable was whether any curable defects
were cured. Overall, the defects were cured in 35% of the 193 cases
for which the defects in the presentation were curable. The final
MCA concluded that the most valuable explanatory variables were
applicant region, bank ID, and issuer region. Specifically, the data in
dicate that, all other things being equal, defects are most likely to be
cured when the applicant is from the industrial West, and when the is
suer is from industrial Asia, and that there is considerable variation
among the portfolios of the banks, even taking account of the mix of
applicants and issuers in their portfolios.
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As with the previous dependent variables, though, those three fac
tors did not explain much of the variance; collectively, they explained
only 5% of the variance in cure rates. Because that is such a low level
of explanatory power, it appears that cure rates (like the other de
pendent variables) generally are controlled by other factors that I did
not collect and are for the most part randomly related to the factors
that I did collect.

